Chapter 10: Browser Wars

In June 1995, a Microsoft representative arrived at Netscape's office. The public goal is to seek ways to cooperate - Netscape is the only dominant force in the browser market, while Microsoft is a technology giant that has just begun to consider the impact of the Internet. However, both parties have doubts about each other's motives.

Marcus Andresen was also present. He is already an online celebrity. James Buxdale, the new CEO of Netscape, is here too. Microsoft is a group of product managers and engineers, hoping to promote Microsoft to enter the Internet market.

The meeting was pretty friendly at the beginning, and the Microsoft delegation shared what they were developing in the latest operating system Windows 95. Then, the situation began to worsen.

According to Netscape, "If Netscape agrees not to make a browser for Windows 95 operating system, Microsoft proposes to invest in Netscape and provides key technical information about the Windows operating system to Netscape's software developers." If this is true, Microsoft will cross the legal boundaries. The company will threaten to use its monopoly to suppress competition.

Andresen, known for his dramatic style, later testified to the Justice Department, used the Godfather allusion to describe the conference: “I expect to find a bloody computer monitor in my bed the next day.”

Microsoft claims that the meeting is a "trap" of Netscape planning, with the goal of luring them into a compromise situation in order to take advantage of this in the future.

There are several different points in time for the beginning of the browser war. For example, the release of Internet Explorer 1 (late summer 1995). Or the day Andresen called Microsoft nothing more than a set of “badly debugged device drivers” (early 1995). But on June 21, 1995, Microsoft and Netscape attended the meeting as possible allies, but left as mortal enemies - were probably the most decisive moment.

Andresen called it "free, but not free."

The operation is as follows. When Netscape browser was released, it sold for $39 per copy. This is the official statement. However, the full Netscape beta is available for free from its website. Colleges and nonprofits can easily obtain zero-cost licenses.

For pioneers of the cyber revolution and open source tradition, cyberscape is already free enough. For formal companies that purchase in bulk and have specific contractual needs, they can obtain a software license at a reasonable fee. Free, but not free. “On the surface it’s free, but it’s not actually,” a Netscape employee later described it. "Companies have to pay for this. Maintenance must also be paid for."

"This is basically a lesson learned from Microsoft, right?" Andresen explained. “If you gain universality, you have many options and many ways to benefit from it.” If people don’t have the ability to access Netscape quickly and easily, it never spreads. This is the lesson Andresen learned after the computer terminal at the NCSA Research Laboratory of the University of Illinois. Just a year ago, he and his friends developed the hugely successful cross-platform Mosaic browser.

Andresen worked in the development of Mosaic for many years in the early 1990s. But he began to feel that the increasing demands from top NCSA executives were cramped by him, hoping to use the success of the browser to make money. At the end of 1993, Andresen went to the west to establish his position in Silicon Valley. There, he met James Clark.

Clark just broke ties with the Silicon Graphics company he founded. Clark is a legend in the Bay Area and is very famous in the valley. When he first saw the internet, he was suggested to meet Andresen. So he went. The two hit it off.

Clark – with his new retirement time and fortune – convenes a core circle of tech visionaries to meet regularly. “For invitees, this seems like a great opportunity to discuss ideas, techniques, strategies,” one statement later said. “For Clark, it’s the first step to building a team of talented, like-minded people who will form his new company.” Andresen remains a passionate and tireless advocate of the network, increasingly becoming the center of this circle.

The two of them thought about several ideas. None of them succeeded. But they keep going back to an idea. Create the world's first commercial browser.

So, on a snowy day in mid-April 1994, Andresen and Clark flew to Illinois. They have only one goal: to hire members of the original Mosaic team who are still working in the NCSA lab for their new company. They went straight to the lobby of a hotel near the university. One by one, Clark met with five people who helped create Mosaic (plus Lynx creator Lou Montulli, a student at the University of Kansas and founder of Lynx) and offered them a job.

Right in the hotel room, Clark printed out a contract with a generous salary and stock options. He then told them about his new company’s mission. “Its mission – to defeat Mosaic! – was clear,” one employee recalled. By the time Andresen and Clark flew back to California the next day, they already had six new employees who were about to be renamed Netscape.

Within six months, they will release their first browser, Netscape Navigator. Six months later, this easy-to-use, easy-to-install browser will sweep the market and connect millions of users to the internet for the first time.

Clark later said of the chaos energy of the browser team and the speed at which they built the software that changed the world, Netscape gave "anarchy with credibility." Writer John Cassidy explains this. “The anarchy in the post-Netscape era means that a group of college students can meet with a wealthy quirky person, raise some money from venture capitalists, and build a multi-billion dollar company in 18 months,” he added, “Anarchy is capitalism as personal liberation.”

There are some restless people inside Microsoft.

The Internet and the Internet are putting the tech giant behind. Windows is the most popular operating system in the world - a virtual monopoly. But that doesn't mean they have no weaknesses.

Back in 1993, three Microsoft employees — Steven Sinovsky, J. Allard and Benjamin Slifka — began to sound the alarm. Their efforts to make Microsoft aware of the promise of the internet are documented in Casey Rebello's 1996 profile of Bloomberg's "Inside Microsoft." “I drag people into my office and they kick and scream,” Sinovsky told Rebello, “I’m making everyone excited about these things.”

Some employees believe that the need for Microsoft to be controlled to the network is distracted. Investments are pouring into a proprietary network like CompuServe or Prodigy, called Microsoft Networks (or MSN). Microsoft wants to control the entire network experience. But MSN will eventually become a huge failure.

Slifka and Allard believe that Microsoft is more suitable to develop with the Internet than to compete with the Internet. “Microsoft needs to make sure we can benefit from the success of the network, not be overwhelmed by it,” Slifka wrote in some of his internal communications.

Allard took it a step further and drafted an internal memo called "Windows: The Internet's Next Killer App." The method proposed by Allard in the document will soon become the cornerstone of Microsoft's Internet strategy. It consists of three parts. First, embrace the open standards of the Internet. Second, expand its technology to the Microsoft ecosystem. Finally (and often forgotten), innovate and improve network technology.

After failing to acquire BookLink's InternetWorks browser in 1994 - AOL took the lead and bid higher - Microsoft finally took the Internet seriously. And their meeting with Netscape did not produce any results. Instead, they reached an agreement with NCSA's business partner Spyglass to license Mosaic for the first Microsoft browser.

In August 1995, Microsoft released Internet Explorer version 1.0. It's not very original, based on code that Spyglass has licensed to dozens of other partners. Released as part of the Internet Jumpstart add-on, the browser is rude and clumsy and difficult to use than the browsers provided by Netscape.

On December 7, Bill Gates held a major press conference on the anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack. He first released the news about Microsoft Networks, the protagonist of the event. But he also demonstrated Internet Explorer, borrowing directly from the language from the Allard proposal. “So, the Internet, competition will become a kind of, embrace and expand again,” Gates announced, “we will embrace all the popular Internet protocols…we will expand on these things.”

Microsoft has entered the market.

Like many of his peers, Rosan Sino began to teach himself about the world of personal computers. After studying English in college – focusing on news – Cino found himself working in a PR company with clients including Dell and Seagate. Cino was naturally curious and resourceful, reading industry magazines and talking to engineers to learn about her personal computers in the information age.

She developed a special talent that could transform the language and story of an engineer into a bold vision for the future. Friendly and infectious, Cino has built phonebooks for industry publications and mass media contacts along the way.

After finding a job at Silicon Graphics, Cino worked closely with James Clark (he later commented that she was "one of SGI's best PR managers"). When Clark plans to leave the company, she agrees with his upset – she helps coordinate the departure – and decides that she will jump if she has the chance to join his new company.

A few months later, she did. Cino is Netscape's 19th employee; its first public relations recruiter.

When Sino arrived at the brand new Netscape office in Mountain View, the first thing she did was sit down and talk to every engineer. She wanted to hear directly from sources what Netscape’s vision was. She heard something. Netscape is building a "killer app" that will make other browsers irrelevant. Their code is better, faster and easier to use than any other code.

Xino knew she couldn't sell good codes. But a young and hard-working team of fresh graduates from rural America is challenging the deep-rooted Silicon Valley; it's something she can sell. “We have a 22-year-old and he’s very interesting, I think, ‘There’s a story there,’” she later said in an interview with the book “Network Architects,” “‘We also have a bunch of kids coming out of Illinois, and I think, ‘There’s a story there, too.’”

Within Netscape, some executives and board members have been discussing an initial public offering (IPO). As Microsoft is chasing, competitor Spyglass has also successfully conducted an IPO, so time is crucial. “Look soon, Microsoft will certainly attack the web browser market with a more serious attitude,” explains author John Cassidy. “If Netscape is going to issue stocks, it makes sense to do so with few competition.” Not to mention, a large, compelling IPO is exactly what the company needs to make headlines around the country.

In the months leading up to the IPO, Cino carefully created Andresen's image for the media. She positioned him as the leader of the software generation, in response to the sleek, silicon-powered hardware generations of today in the 1960s and 1970s. In the interview and profile, Cino makes sure Andresen gives the impression of being extremely smart and visionary, ready to overturn the old ways of doing things; "New Bill Gates."

This requires a considerable degree of cooperation from Andresen. “One of my real challenges was to build Marcus into a character,” she said later. Sometimes Andreson complains about interviews, “but I always say, ‘Look, we really need to do that.’ He’s smart about that. He gets it.” Soon, it almost came out, and Netscape’s hype continued to swell when Andreson headed with CEO James Buxdale to meet with potential investors for an IPO.

August 9, 1995 was the day of Netscape IPO. Employees buzzed in their offices in Mountain View, too nervous to watch financial news on screen or TV. “It’s like saying don’t pay attention to the pink elephant dancing in your living room,” [Sino said later]. They didn't have to worry. On the first day of listing, Netscape's stock price rose 108%. This is the best opening day for Wall Street stocks. Some founding employees became millionaires that night.

Soon after, Netscape released version 2.0 of its browser. This is their most ambitious version to date. The software bundles tools for checking emails, talking to friends, and writing documents. It's stylish and fast. The Netscape homepage launched every time the software is started, showing a variety of clever and well-known online adventures.

Not to mention JavaScript. Netscape 2 is the first version that includes a Java applet, a small application that runs directly in the browser. With Java, Netscape aims to compete directly with Microsoft and its operating systems.

To cooperate with the release, Netscape recruited a young programmer, Brandon Edge, to develop a Java-based scripting language. The result is JavaScript. Edge created the first version in 10 days as a way for developers to make pages more interactive and dynamic. It's original, but easy to master, and powerful. Since then, it has become one of the most popular programming languages ​​in the world.

Microsoft followed closely behind. But Netscape feels confident. They have completed the most ambitious product ever. “In the battle between bears and crocodile, it is the terrain that decides the outcome,” Andresen said in an early interview with Netscape. “What Microsoft just did was to get into our territory.”

There is an old saying from Microsoft, that is, it is not until version 3.0 to get things done. Even their flagship product, Windows, is notoriously so.

The first version of Internet Explorer is a hasty porting of Mosaic code, which is at best a public statement indicating that Microsoft will enter the browser business. The second version was released after Netscape's IPO in late 1995. It was iterated quickly, but it lags far behind Netscape. With Internet Explorer 3, Microsoft is starting to make browsers right.

Microsoft's large, compelling press conference touted Internet Explorer as a true market challenger. Behind the scenes, it works more like a secret experiment. The initial product team had only six people. In a company with more than 10,000 people. “A little like the original Mac team, the IE team felt like a pioneer at Microsoft,” Brad Silberg, former head of Internet Explorer, said later, “the pioneer of the industry, fighting for survival.”

This situation changed quickly. Once Microsoft recognizes the potential of the network, they shift their focus to the network. In the book Accelerating the Network, the book is a comprehensive account of the rise of Netscape and its decline in Microsoft's hands, authors Josh Quitner and Michelle Slatar describe Microsoft's strategy. "To some extent, its quality doesn't matter. If the first generation fails, Gates can assign his team of best and smartest programmers to write improved models. If that fails, he can hire better programmers and try again. Time and time. Time and time. He has almost unlimited resources."

By version 3.0, the Internet Explorer team already had 100 people (including Chris Wilson from the NCSA Mosaic team). In a few years, this number will reach thousands. The software quickly closed the gap. Internet Explorer introduces features that give Netscape the edge—even introduces their own HTML extensions, dynamic animation tools for developers, and initial support for CSS.

In the summer of 1996, Walter Mosberg talked about Microsoft's browser. Just a few months ago, he also called Netscape Navigator the "obvious victory." But he started to change his mind. "However, I think Internet Explorer 3.0 is better," he wrote after Microsoft released version 3.0. “It’s better than Navigator 3.0 because it’s easier to use and has a cleaner, more flexible user interface.”

Still, most Microsoft executives know that relying solely on features is not enough. In December 1996, Senior Vice President James Orchin sent an email to his boss Paul Maritz. He elaborated on the current strategy of catching up with Netscape’s feature set. “I don’t understand how IE can win,” Orchin admitted, “My conclusion is that we have to make more use of Windows.” In the same email, he added, “We should first consider an integration solution – that’s our strengths.” Microsoft won’t give in easily. They focus on two things: integration with Windows and wider distribution.

When Internet Explorer 4 was released, it was more integrated with the operating system than any previous version; an almost integral part of the Windows package. It can be used to browse files and folders. Its "push" technology allows you to stream the network even if you are not actively using the software. It uses internal APIs that are not available to external developers, making the browser faster, smoother, and easier to use.

Then there is distribution. A few days after Netscape and AOL reached an agreement to include their browsers on the AOL platform, AOL suddenly changed its mind and instead worked with Internet Explorer. It was later revealed that Microsoft made them one, as one writer said (again expansion of the metaphor of The Godfather), a “proposal they cannot refuse.” Microsoft has minimized its price, and more importantly, promises to pre-install precious real estate on the desktop of AOL's next Windows version.

Microsoft fired a second shot with Compaq. Until then, all Compaq computers had Netscape pre-installed on Windows. When Windows threatened to suspend their licenses for Windows entirely (this was later disclosed in court documents), this was also changed to Internet Explorer.

By the time Windows 98 was released, Internet Explorer 4 was pre-installed and was free for every user and could not be deleted.

"Mozilla!" Jamie Zawinsky interjected. He was having a meeting at the time, and the conference room was silent now. People turned around. Then, they continued.

This is the early days of Netscape. Some employees in the engineering and marketing department came together to try to come up with a name for the matter. One employee suggested that they were going to smash Mosaic, just like smashing bugs. Zawinsky – with his famous sarcastic sense of humor – thinks Mozilla, “just like Mosaic meets Godzilla.”

Eventually, marketer Greg Sands chose Netscape. But in the office, the browser has been nicknamed Mozilla since then. Early marketing materials on the web even featured Mozilla-inspired mascot, a green lizard with a self-righteous smile before they replaced it with a more professional mascot.

It will take a few years before the name will return in any open way; Zawinsky will also be involved.

Zawinsky has worked at Netscape almost from the beginning. He is the 20th employee, recruited after Rosan Cino to replace Andresen's work at NCSA, and is responsible for developing the flagship version of Netscape for X-Windows. By the time he joined, he had already gained a reputation for solving complex challenges.

Zawinsky's earliest programming memory can be traced back to eighth grade. In high school, he was a bad student. But he still managed to get a job as a programmer after school, working on the only thing that kept him interested: code. After that, he began working for startup Lucid, Inc., which has a strong lineage of programming legends. Zawinsky is dedicated to the Common Lisp programming language and the popular IDE Emacs; a technology that is respected in the still small programming community. With his work on these projects, Zawinsky gained instant credibility among the tech elite.

At Netscape, the engineering team is at the heart of how things work. That’s why Cino chose to meet with members of the team immediately after she started working and why she made up Netscape’s story around the way they operate. The result is a high pressure, high intensity environment that is so indispensable to the company that it will become part of the company’s myth. They move so quickly that many people start to call this rapid development speed "Netscape Time."

"It was really a great environment. I really liked it," Zawinsky later recalled. “We kept arguing because everyone was convinced that they were right, but it allowed us to communicate quickly.” But the temper was indeed irritable (an article detailing his chair on the wall after a computer crashed and suddenly left for two weeks), and many engineers later reflected on the toxic workplace. Zawinsky once said simply: “It’s not healthy.”

Despite this, engineers still have a great influence in the organization. Many engineers, including Zawinsky, are advocates of free software. "I think you can say that I've been doing free software since I started making software," he later said in an interview. For Zawinsky, the software should be free. From the earliest stages of his Netscape project, he advocated a more free version of the browser. He and the rest of the engineering team are at least partially responsible for creative licensing in the company's "free, but not free" business model.

In 1997, technical manager Frank Heckel injected new vitality into the free software model. He wrote a 30-page white paper that came up with what several engineers had wanted for years—releasing the entire source code of the browser for free. “The key point I’m trying to illustrate in this document is,” Heckel asserted, “In order to compete effectively, Netscape requires more people and companies to work with Netscape and invest in Netscape’s success.”

With the help of Chief Technology Officer Eric Hahn, Heckel and Zawinsky put their arguments all the way to the top. When they met with James Buxdale, most of the company had embraced the idea. To everyone's surprise, Barksdale agreed.

On January 23, 1998, Netscape issued two announcements. The first one is what everyone expects. Netscape has been competing with Microsoft for nearly a year. The latest version of Internet Explorer 4 is directly bundled with free access to Windows operating systems and is occupying an increasing market share. Therefore, Netscape announced that it will also provide its browser for free.

The next announcement is shocking. Netscape will turn to open source. The entire source code of the browser—millions of lines of code—will be released to the public and be open to contributions to anyone in the world. Under Netscape veterans Michael Toy, Tara Hernandez, Scott Collins and Jamie Zawinsky, the team will have three months to remove the code base and prepare it for public distribution. This work also has a name: Mozilla.

On the surface, Netscape looks calm and ready to fight Microsoft with the support of the open source community. Within the company, the situation looks very different. The next three months were filled with fanatical energy, near failures and unparalleled speed. Engineers recaptured Netscape’s early innovation spirit, working frantically to fix bugs and get the code ready to be published to the world. In the end, they did it, but it was just a lucky draw.

In the process, the project developed into an independent organization under the Mozilla.org domain name. It consists entirely of Netscape engineers, but Mozilla is not technically part of Netscape. When Mozilla held a press conference in April 1998 (a few months after his public statement), it wasn't just Netscape members who attended.

Zawinsky organized the party, insisting that more and more people outside the company who contributed to the project are now involved. “We are giving away code. We are sharing the development responsibilities of our flagship products with the entire network, so we should also invite them to the party,” he said, adding, “It’s a new world.”

On the day of his testimony in November 1998, Steve McGidedy sat motionlessly in the witness stand, as one writer described. He has been looking forward to this moment for a long time; in his opinion, he can finally reveal the moment of insidious and monopoly strains in Microsoft.

The Justice Department has several key witnesses in its antitrust case against Microsoft, but McGidey is the key figure. As Intel's vice president, McGidey often deals with Microsoft; his company is outside the conflict between Netscape and Microsoft. However, there is an additional tension in his testimony. “Dramatically adds unmeasurable reality,” one journalist noted in his description of the trial, “no one—literally, no one—knows what McGidey would say.”

When he got the chance to speak, McGidey testified that senior Microsoft executives told him that their goal was to "cut off the air supply from Netscape." Microsoft uses its monopoly in the operating system market to threaten computer manufacturers — many of whom have regular business dealings with Intel — to ship their computers with Internet Explorer, or else they will face the risk of their Windows license being completely revoked.

McGidey borrowed the language Bill Gates used when announcing Internet Explorer, claiming that one executive elaborated on their strategy: “Embraise, expand and eliminate.” According to him, Microsoft never intended to compete with Netscape. They are ready to crush them using every radical tactic and reach legal boundaries. This is a major turning point in the case and a major victory for the Ministry of Justice.

However, the case against Microsoft began several years ago when Netscape hired a team from antitrust law firm Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati in the summer of 1995. The legal team includes the outspoken anti-Microsoft fighter Gary Rebuck and Susan Creighton. Rebuck will be the most public member of the company over the next five years, but ultimately shifts the Justice Department's attention to Creton's contribution. Creighton began his career as a clerk of Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. She quickly gained a reputation for precision and meticulousness. Her methodical, well-organized approach makes her very suitable for a comprehensive and complete analysis of Microsoft's anti-competitive strategy.

Creton worked with Netscape to write a 222-page document detailing Microsoft's anti-competitive behavior. She explained her case briefly and clearly. "This is a monopoly (Microsoft) problem, which has maintained a monopoly position for more than a decade (desktop operating system). This monopoly position is threatened by new technologies (network software)....”

The document was originally planned to be published as a book, but Netscape is worried that if the public knows how dangerous they are at Microsoft, their stock price will plummet. Instead, Creton and Netscape handed it over to the Department of Justice.

Within the Justice Department, this will trigger a renewed interest in the ongoing antitrust investigation against Microsoft. It was followed by years of subpoena, information collection and lengthy testimony. In May 1998, after nearly three years, the Department of Justice and prosecutors from 20 states filed antitrust lawsuits against Microsoft, which had just exceeded 50% of the browser market share.

“No company should be allowed to use its monopoly power to control the browser software needed to access the internet,” Clinton-based Attorney General Janet Renault announced in his bid to file charges against Microsoft.

The center of the trial is not Microsoft's control over personal computer software—it is not technically illegal. It is the way they use their monopoly position to directly fight competition in other markets. For example, threats to revoke licenses from manufacturers that bundle computers with Netscape. Netscape's description of the June 1995 meeting also played a role (when asked why he made such a detailed record of the meeting, he replied, "I think this might at some point become the subject of discussing antitrust issues with the U.S. government.")

Throughout the trial, Microsoft responded poorly to the censorship both publicly and privately. They insist that they are right; they are doing the best things for their clients. In interviews and testimony, Bill Gates often acts rude and contemptuous, unwilling or unable to succumb to any concessions to power. The company insists that browsers and operating systems coexist, one cannot be without the other - a fact that the judge easily refuted when he noticed that he managed to uninstall Internet Explorer from Windows in "less than 90 seconds". As tech enthusiasts and news fans hold their breath and wait for every new discovery, the trial becomes a national sensation.

In November 1999, the presiding judge issued his ruling. Microsoft did use its monopoly power and violated antitrust laws. Subsequently, in the summer of 2000, a proposed remedy was proposed: Microsoft would be split into two separate companies, one responsible for its operating system software and the other responsible for its applications. "When Microsoft has to compete by innovation rather than relying on its monopoly crutches, it will innovate more; it will have to innovate more. And others will be free to innovate," Iowa Attorney General Tom Miller said after the judge's ruling was announced.

This never happened. An appeal in 2002 led to the overturn of the ruling and the Justice Department agreed to a lighter consent order. By then, Internet Explorer's market share had reached about 90%. The browser war is actually over.

"Are you looking for alternatives to Netscape and Microsoft browsers? Do you like the idea of ​​having an MDI user interface and being able to browse in multiple windows? ... Is your browser slow? Try Opera."

This short message first announced Opera to the world in April 1995, published by the creator of the browser to the Usenet forum on Windows. The tone of the news—technically rigorous, slightly sharp, yet truly idealistic—reflects the philosophy of Opera founders Jon Stephenson von Tezkner and Gail Ivarsi. They claim that Opera is very consistent with the Internet’s ideology.

Opera was originally a project by the Norwegian telecom company Telnor. Once it became stable, von Tzkner and Ivarsi rented space in Telnor and grew it into an independent company. Soon after, they released the announcement and released the first version of Opera web browser.

Opera's team is small but focused and efficient, loyal to the open network. “The browser flows in our blood,” Tezkner later said. The Opera team proved this time and again. They are true believers in the network and often take pride in leading the development of network standards and accessibility networks.

In the mid to late 1990s, Gail Ivarsi was the first to implement the CSS standard in any browser (Opera 3.5). This would be enough to convince CSS creator Haken Wim Leigh to join the company as CTO. Ian Hickson worked at Opera during W3C development of CSS acidity tests.

Back in 1998, the company began developing versions of its browser for low-power mobile devices in developing countries. They often try to push the entire online community towards network standards, leading by example as much as possible.

After years of reversals in Microsoft's antitrust lawsuit and its appeal, Opera finds itself involved in a conflict in different aspects of the browser war.

In 2007, Opera complained to the European Commission. Much like the case filed by Creighton and Netscape, Opera claims Microsoft abuses its monopoly to tie a new version of Internet Explorer to Windows 7. The EU has begun investigating allegations against Microsoft almost simultaneously with the Justice Department, but Opera's complaints have added an important and recent area of ​​investigation. Opera claims Microsoft restricts user selection by making it opaque. “You can add more browsers so that consumers can really choose between browsers, and you can put them in front of their eyes,” Lee said in the complaint.

In Opera's summary of its complaints, they themselves painted a free and open picture of the Internet. They believe that Opera is the advocate of the network as it wants – accessible, universal and equal. Again citing the language of “embrace, expand and eliminate”, the company also called on Microsoft to abide by its public statements in support of these standards rather than stifle them with its infamous “embrace, expand and eliminate” strategy. “The complaint calls on Microsoft to abide by its public statements in support of these standards rather than stifle them with its infamous 'embrace, expand and eliminate' strategies," it wrote.

2010年，欧盟委员会发布了一项裁决，迫使微软向欧洲Windows用户显示所谓的“投票箱”——用户第一次访问互联网时可以看到的一个网站，其中列出了十二个可供下载的替代浏览器，包括Opera和Mozilla。微软在其欧洲Windows安装中包含了这个网站五年，直到他们的义务到期。

网景导航器5从未发布。它未发布，在软件最公开和最知名的vaporware的走廊中回响。

网景将浏览器开源作为Mozilla项目的一部分后，该公司的重点发生了变化。在被美国在线收购以及微软持续施压的情况下，网景已经走到了尽头。微软的公开审判带来了一些喘息的机会，但为时已晚。“这是这里的一个巨大讽刺，”网景律师加里·雷巴克后来说道，“经过多年的努力才让政府采取行动，到[1998年]，网景的尸体已经在太平间了。”与此同时，网景内部的管理层无法决定如何最好地与Mozilla团队合作。他们没有与开源项目合作，而是继续维护一个与公共项目分开且独立的网景版本。

1998年10月，布兰登·艾奇（他是核心Mozilla团队的成员）在Mozilla博客上发布了一篇文章。“是时候停止在我们旧的布局和FE代码库上撞头了，”他写道。“我们从这些车辆中获得的里程比任何人预期的都要多。我们现在有一个很棒的新布局引擎，可以查看数百个顶级网站。”

许多Mozilla贡献者都同意这种观点，但艾奇提出的重写将导致该项目的最初失败。当Mozilla在浏览器的全新渲染引擎上进行修补时——这很快就会被称为Gecko——网景取消了其计划中的5.0版。

进展停滞不前。扎温斯基是反对重写的Mozilla团队成员之一，他后来描述了他1999年从网景辞职时的沮丧。“这几乎构成了浏览器的全面重写，让我们倒退了六到十个月。现在，在任何人甚至可以浏览网络或添加书签之前，我们必须从头开始重写整个用户界面。”网景最初的程序员之一斯科特·科林斯则说得不那么委婉：“你不能把50磅的垃圾装进10磅的袋子里，这花了我们两年时间。我们没有发布5.0版，这让我们损失了一切，这是有史以来最大的错误。”

结果是一个具有出色标准支持和快速运行的浏览器引擎的世界级浏览器。但直到2000年4月最终发布网景6时，它才准备就绪。到那时，微软已经超越了网景，占据了80%的浏览器市场份额。这永远不足以夺回该浏览器市场份额的很大一部分。

“我真的很认为浏览器大战结束了，”网景6发布后，一位IT高管说道。 He is right.网景将在未来几年逐渐消失。至于Mozilla，它很快就会以完全不同的形式重生。

你喜欢像这样的故事来学习网络历史吗？Jay 正在讲述网络的完整故事，每两周都有新的故事。注册他的时事通讯以了解最新的……过去的内容。

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