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ZKSync空投惹爭議來看Web3專案冷啟動的困境

WBOY
WBOY原創
2024-06-19 02:41:291031瀏覽

ZKSync空投惹爭議來看Web3專案冷啟動的困境

摘要:上週最火熱的議題肯定是ZKsync的公開空投查驗的事件了,本來筆者正在學習並書寫一些關於TON的DApp開發的學習經驗,但是看到這個頗具爭議的事件,以及引發的社區的廣泛討論,頗有一些感受,因此撰文一篇,希望與大家分享。總的來說,ZKSync的空投方案採用了一個基於財產證明的分配方式,更聚焦於對開發者,核心貢獻者和ZKSync原生Degen巨鯨的獎勵,這就造成了一個局面原生Degen巨鯨在笑,擼毛工作室在叫。

社群爭論的焦點:互動是關鍵還是資金量是關鍵

很長一段時間,Web3產業似乎已經形成了透過Airdrop吸引用戶使用產品,從而實現專案冷啟動的範式。在Layer2賽道中更是如此,透過引導開發者和用戶對潛在空投的預期,刺激開發者積極構建並維護DApp,同時刺激用戶在發展早期將資金橋接到目標Layer2,並積極參與目標Layer2上面運行的DApp,從而起到活躍生態的目的,這已經成為了一種制式。

因此在過去,用戶普遍對於ZKSync的空投預期是對標它的兩個直接競品,Arbitrum和Optimism。當然無論從行業影響力,VC背景,募資規模等角度來思考,這個結論都是合乎邏輯的,然而結果卻大相徑庭,這就導致了很多復用過去經驗來參與ZKSync的用戶似乎並沒有得到期望內的獎勵數量,從而導致了社區陷入了廣泛的爭論中。

為了探究這個爭論背後的原因並探討一些對未來的借鑒意義,自然是需要回顧一下之前的Arbitrum和Optimism的空投規則的設定。首先回顧Arbitrum的空投活動,這要追溯到2023年3月,其為Aribitrum用戶分配了佔總供應量11.62%的Arb空投,同時為Arbitrum生態中運行的DAO分配了1.13%的Arb空投。空投活動的設定是基於2023年2月6日的快照數據,針對用戶具體的規則如下:

  • 跨鏈到Arbitrum: 用戶需要將資金轉入Arbitrum One或Arbitrum Nova。
  • 不同時間段內的交易: 用戶在兩個不同的月份、六個不同的月份或九個不同的月份進行過交易。
  • 交易頻率和互動: 用戶進行了超過4筆、10筆、25筆或100筆交易,或與相應數量的智能合約進行了互動。
  • 交易價值: 用戶進行的交易總價值超過10,000美元、50,000美元或250,000美元。
  • 提供流動性: 用戶已存入超過10,000美元、50,000美元或250,000美元的流動資金
  • Arbitrum Nova活動: 用戶在Arbitrum Nova上進行了超過3筆、5筆或10筆交易。

每個細則會有具體的分數計算方式,分數上限為15分,這個分數用於確定使用者可以領取的Arb數量,計算方式可以近似為線性關係,但是起始獎勵從3分開始,封頂獎勵10200個Arb。而針對DAO的獎勵,則直接按照活躍度評估的方式來確定具體金額,從結果上看最終137個DAO獲得了空投,其中Treasure和GMX獲得的最多,分別為800萬個Arb,按照當前的實質,這實在是一筆豐厚的收益。

接下來回顧Optimism,與Arbitrum不同,Optimism的空投共分多輪次進行,總共分配獎勵數量佔總供應量的19%,其最早的第一輪空投活動要追溯到2022年6月,總共有5%的獎勵被分發給了26萬個地址,截止到目前已經進行了四輪空投,其每輪空投的具體規則如下:

  • 第一輪:以交易次數劃分了一般用戶與活躍用戶,分別對應交易1次的地址與交易大於4次的地址,以及Ethereum DAO的參與者,Ethereum多簽錢包使用者,Gitcoin捐贈者與跨鏈橋使用者。每種身分對應一個定值獎勵,後三種獎勵可疊加。
  • 第二輪:總交易gas fee大於6.1美金或參與委託治理的幣齡超過2000的用戶可以瓜分11,742,277個$OP;
  • 第三輪:參與委託治理的幣年齡超過18000的用戶可以瓜分19,411,313個$OP;
  • 第四輪:針對NFT的創建者分配了10,343,757個$OP;

#從上述回顧我們不難發現,其具體的活動設定中都會以互動次數作為一個重要的參考指標,互動越頻繁的使用者通常可獲得的獎勵越多。然而這個潛規則似乎被ZKSync摒棄了,在ZKSync的空投設計中,ZKsync 用戶的資格和分配分為四個連續步驟來選取併計算,具體規則大致如下:

  • Eligibility Screening: Every address that has transacted on ZKsync Era and ZKsync Lite will be checked against eligibility criteria. It has set 7 inspection criteria to screen qualified users, such as interacting with more than 10 non-token contracts and the non-token contracts must be active for at least 30 days, sending at least 5 transactions in the ZKsync Era, etc.
  • Distribution: When calculating the specific reward amount for an address that meets the above criteria, confirmation is based on a value scaling formula based on the amount sent to the ZKsync Era and the time those crypto assets have been retained in the wallet. Calculate a time-weighted average and use this to adjust the allocation of each address. At the same time, funds participating in the DApp protocol will receive a 2x bonus. This means that you transfer large funds to ZKSync and keep them for a long time. Time, and actively using these funds to participate in some risky products, such as providing liquidity to DEX, will earn more rewards.
  • Multiplier: Addresses that meet certain criteria can receive a multiplier in the allocation. These standards typically hold some high-risk altcoin or NFT native to ZKSync.
  • Sybil detection: Finally, ZKSync will also do Sybil attack detection to ensure that most robots are filtered out. The detection criteria are from two aspects, the source of the first ETH after the creation of an EOA address, and the source of the ETH The interaction between EOA address and CEX deposit address. In fact, this also takes advantage of the characteristics of CEX KYC.

From the specific rules, it is not difficult to find that the number of interactions is not involved in the calculation of rewards, but focuses more on the amount of funds in a single account and the willingness to allocate risky assets. Therefore, when the results were announced, many fans or studios who relied on past experiences and interacted heavily on ZKSync were shocked. This was also the source of the entire controversy. In order to increase the number of addresses that receive potential airdrops, this group of users usually choose to disperse large funds into address groups as much as possible. These address groups are usually hundreds or even thousands, and use small funds to participate in a certain agreement. Determine some possible incentive behaviors, frequently interact through automated scripts or manual methods, and complete tasks to increase potential benefits. The airdrop setting of ZKSync makes this strategy ineffective. The handling fees paid by many frequently interacting addresses are even higher than the rewards received, which naturally arouses dissatisfaction among this group of people.

Moreover, it is not difficult for us to find a large number of airdrop hunter KOLs in , therefore putting pressure on ZKSync officials through social media, hoping to change this situation. However, judging from the official attitude, it seems that they are also very tough and have not changed the rules due to pressure, which is why the current situation has occurred. The accusations and justifications for some possible evil behaviors triggered by the debate are the highlights of this public opinion war.

Judging from the results, the appeals of both sides seem to be understandable. The right and wrong can only be discussed from what angle, but I think there are some things worth thinking about, that is, to this day, Web3 Who are the core value users in the cold start phase of the project, or what kind of users should be encouraged in the cold start phase.

Heavy interaction brings witch attack problems, and property proof brings monopoly problems

Based on Airdrop rewards for early bird participants, it has been proven to be an effective cold start of Web3 projects Means, a good airdrop mechanism setting can help the project efficiently attract seed users in the early stage. At the same time, it can complete user education and increase the stickiness of the product by stimulating users to use key behaviors of the protocol. This is also the fundamental reason why for a long time, the airdrop settings of most Web3 projects have focused on incentivizing interactive behaviors. However, this has brought a drawback, which is that it lowers the threshold for obtaining rewards, which can easily cause activities to encounter witch attacks. Because interactive behaviors are easy to be automated and batched, this gives many professional teams room for batch operations. When a large number of robot accounts pour in, although the protocol will have a short-term false prosperity, these "users" usually gradually Living alone cannot provide impetus for the future development of the project. After receiving the rewards, most of them will be cashed out to increase the capital turnover rate and thereby increase profits. This incentive mechanism actually dilutes the number of rewards the project side gives to those users with real value. It’s really not worth the loss.

So why did this mechanism work well in the early days? This was naturally because there were not so many similar professional teams at that time. Most users had not yet formed a habit of thinking about this incentive mechanism, and their interactive behavior was still It is relatively pure and belongs to real users, which allows incentives to be distributed to these users more efficiently. The resulting wealth effect also helps the project party realize the above benefits. However, with the impact of the money-making effect, this This method is obviously no longer effective in attracting real users. One of my personal feelings is that the effectiveness of airdrop activities with interaction as the main incentive has basically reached its peak by the time of the Arbitrum airdrop.

This is also the fundamental reason why ZKSync wants to abandon the use of interaction numbers as the basis for identifying valuable users based on the relative size of assets. However, this method of property certification may not be without problems. Although the risk of witch attacks can be more effectively identified and eliminated, a new problem that comes with it is the uneven distribution of wealth caused by monopoly.

We know that one of the core values ​​of the Web3 project is the bottom-up distributed autonomy model. This means that the support of grassroots users (real users with small amounts of capital) is the basis for the development of a project. It is precisely with the grassroots users that some whale users can pour in and form a more sustainable development form. After all, the financial advantage is still available in most scenarios. Only if there are enough grassroots users, the whale users will benefit. Just big enough. Then the distribution system of property certificate will lead to the obvious benefits of whale users among its early bird users at the beginning of the cold start. This makes it difficult to form effective incentives for grassroots users, and naturally it is impossible to form a cohesive community.

In the final analysis, for Web3 projects, when designing the cold start mechanism, you still need to carefully consider the user profile that is valuable to your product, and design corresponding mechanisms and effective incentives based on the current environment. The top priority is to protect the above-mentioned value users while trying to avoid witch attacks. Therefore, how to design your own cold start mechanism is a very valuable topic, and everyone is welcome to leave a message in my X for discussion. Brainstorm some fun options together.

X Links: https://x.com/web3_mario

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