How to solve the selling pressure problem of token unlocking? Hack VC proposes two potential solutions

Compiled by: Zen, PANews

Token Vesting (Unlocking) Current Situation In the current market cycle, tokens are launched with high valuations and low initial circulating supply (i.e., “low circulation/high FDV tokens”), which has caused the crypto community to be concerned about public Market investors are worried about the sustainable rise. A large number of tokens are expected to be unlocked by 2030, which could bring potential selling pressure unless demand increases to balance it out.
Historically, contributors to a protocol network typically received a percentage of tokens from the fully diluted supply that vested on a term structure. It is crucial that contributors are appropriately compensated while also balancing the interests of retail investors in the token market. Because if the proportion of vested tokens accounts for too large a proportion of the token market value, thereby affecting the available liquidity, the vesting event may have an adverse impact on the token price and harm all token holders; on the other hand, , if contributors are not properly compensated, they will no longer be motivated to continue working on the project, which ultimately hurts all holders as well.
Traditional token vesting parameters include: allocated token percentage, cliff period, vesting length and payment frequency. All parameters only operate in the time dimension. However, using only the typical parameters described above limits the scope of the solution to a narrow dimension. By integrating new parameters, previously untapped value can be unlocked.
Consider a liquidity-adjusted token vesting plan based on the liquidity dimension. The idea extends the normal vesting structure by introducing a new parameter: liquidity. Defining liquidity is not an exact science and there are many ways to quantify it.
One way to measure liquidity is the buyer depth of a token, including buy order depth on-chain and on centralized exchanges (CEX). The cumulative sum of all buy-side depths can be considered "bLiquidity" (buy-side liquidity).
Contributors can add a new parameter to their attribution terms, namely "percentage of bLiquidity" or "pbLiquidity". This number can theoretically be between 0 and 1.
min (the number of tokens that should vest in normal vesting calculations, pbLiquidity bLiquidity the fully diluted valuation of a single token)
Here’s an example of how this works: Let’s say a token has a total supply of 100 units , of which 12% (12 tokens) are allocated to contributors under vesting, with the token price being $1 each. Assume linear monthly vesting for 12 months from the token generation event, no cliff period, and the token price remains unchanged. Typically, vesting will allow for the redemption of 1 token per month, without regard to other factors. Now, let’s say the pbLiquidity is 20% during the vesting period and the token has at least $10 of bLiquidity over the 12-month period. In the first month of vesting, the contract will look at the bLiquidity number of $10, multiplied by the pbLiquidity number of 20%, to get $2.
pbLiquidity bLiquidity Token unit FDV = 0.2 10 1 = 2 USD
According to the above minimum function, since 1 token * 1 USD is less than 2 USD, 1 token will vest in the normal way. However, changing the above number to $2 of bLiquidity, in this case 20% of $2 is $0.40, so at a token price of $1, only 4/10 of the tokens will vest.
pbLiquidity bLiquidity Token unit FDV = 0.2 2 1 = 0.4 USD
This is the liquidity-adjusted vesting.
Advantages: In the past, vesting claims only focused on time, and may indirectly focus on the fact that there will be enough liquidity to absorb vesting at a specific price. This construct explicitly states that contributors should focus on the liquidity of their tokens and combines this goal with specific incentives. Token holders who are not within the vesting period, i.e. buyers in the liquid market before the unlock date, can rest assured that a single vesting claim will not cause the price to plummet due to lack of liquidity. Previously, public token holders only had to trust the goodwill and intentions of those claiming their tokens. With this improvement, they now have a clear reason to feel reassured. Disadvantages/Challenges If the token never reaches sufficient liquidity, this can cause contributors’ payouts to fluctuate and ultimately extend the vesting period significantly. It complicates the simple payment frequency that contributors are accustomed to. May incentivize fake buyer liquidity. But there are many ways to deal with this problem. For example, one could consider bLiquidity within a certain price range, or an LP position with a certain time lock element. People can claim tokens from vesting but not sell them immediately, thus accumulating large balances. Later, they may sell all their tokens at once, which may significantly affect liquidity and cause the token price to fall. However, this situation is similar to someone gradually accumulating a large amount of liquid tokens. There is always a risk that a large, concentrated pool of liquid token holders could sell together and cause the price to fall. Obtaining bLiquidity numbers in a trust-minimized manner is much easier on decentralized exchanges than on centralized exchanges, which publish their order book data themselves. How does the project ensure there is sufficient liquidity to support a reasonable vesting plan? One idea is to reward locked LP positions with incentives. Another is to attract liquidity providers, which will be able to create a stable market on exchanges by borrowing tokens from project vaults and pairing them with stablecoins.
基於里程碑維度另一個可以改善代幣歸屬計畫的維度是里程碑。用戶數量、交易量、協議收入、鎖定總價值（TVL）等里程碑，透過可量化的數位捕捉協議的整體吸引力。
自然地，協議可以為上述參數設定二進制閾值或梯度，這些參數因素納入歸屬計劃。例如，協議必須有超過1億美元的TVL、100個以上的每日活躍用戶和/或超過1000萬美元的90天平均每日交易量，才能歸屬100%的正常時間相關歸屬。如果這些數字低於閾值，歸屬的數量要么完全停止（基於二元方式），要么相對於初始閾值目標按比例降低（基於梯度方式）。在二進制和梯度之間，梯度似乎更有意義。
優點這種里程碑方法確保在歸屬發生時協議將具有一定的吸引力和流動性，從而隨著時間的推移產生更健康的協議。里程碑減少了對時間的強調。缺點/挑戰包括活躍用戶和交易量在內的統計數據可以被操縱。 TVL 指標的可操縱性較差，但對資本效率較高的協議而言也不甚重要。收入也更難操控，但洗錢交易等活動也可能轉化為更多費用，帶來更多收入，因此仍有被操控的空間。在評估操縱的可能性時，重要的是要注意其中的動機。激勵統計數據的操控主要來自團隊和投資者，他們也都是在歸屬計畫上的人。公開市場買家不太可能操控統計數據，因為他們沒有動機推動加速歸屬。此外，強而有力的代幣認股權條款在鏈下法律協議中可以顯著減輕激勵方的惡意行為。例如，如果團隊成員或投資者被發現進行洗錢交易，或人為地惡意提高用戶活動，他們可能會失去其代幣，從而對違反規則的行為施加嚴厲的懲罰。
結論當前市場趨勢中的高估值、低初始流通供應量代幣引發了對公開市場投資者可持續回報的擔憂。傳統的基於時間的歸屬計畫可能無法完全解決代幣流動性和市場條件的複雜性。透過將流動性和基於里程碑的維度整合到歸屬計畫中，專案可以更好地協調激勵措施，確保足夠的市場深度，並促進真正的吸引力。
儘管這些方法也帶來了新的挑戰，但更強大的歸屬機制的好處是顯著的。在採取適當保障措施的情況下，這些增強的歸屬模型可以提高市場信心，並為所有利害關係人創造一個更永續的生態系統。

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